Sanaa, Yemen – Both Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the Houthi rebel group began mobilising fighters in late June. Then, on July 3, the first publicly announced flight between Tehran and Sanaa for more than a decade landed in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital, creating new tensions. Fighting during the next day between the two sides in western Yemen’s Hodeidah governorate killed dozens, the worst violence in four years.
And then, on Monday, the attempted landing of another flight from Tehran in Sanaa led to the bombing of the airport’s runway by the Yemeni government, and the firing of Houthi ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia.
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Yemen’s Defence Minister Taher al-Aqili said that the government’s “patience has run out”. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that the “de-escalation phase” of Yemen’s war was over.
Yemen’s war, now more than 10 years old, had been cold since a truce was agreed in 2022. But, with the Houthis’ main ally Iran fighting the US and bombing the Gulf, the conflict in the Middle East’s poorest country may be about to reignite, plunging Yemen back into large-scale war.
Regional threats
The Houthis have blamed Saudi Arabia for the attack on Sanaa airport, despite the Yemeni government’s claim that it was responsible.
Salah Ali Salah, a researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, described the recent rhetoric from the Houthis as “striking”, and pointed out that the consequences of their actions will not be limited to the front lines in Yemen.
“The Houthis have openly rejected the continuation of the ‘no war, no peace’ status quo while simultaneously expanding campaigns to mobilise fighters and the broader population,” Salah told Al Jazeera. “This rhetoric is not solely intended to augment internal mobilisation or contain the growing social and economic pressures that have grown during prolonged periods of relative calm on the front lines. Rather, it appears to be preparing the political and propaganda landscape for another phase of war that could have repercussions on the region.”
The war between Iran and the US has demonstrated the problems spillover from regional conflicts can have on Gulf security. And as Iran attacks the Gulf from the east, the fear is that the Houthis will attack from the south – as they have done in the past, during the height of the Yemen war.
“The Houthis possess both the geographic position and the military capabilities to make them one of the most consequential actors capable of exerting pressure on Gulf states or disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea,” Salah said.
But that doesn’t mean it is certain, and there would be consequences for the Houthis. They have already come under heavy attack over the past few years from Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States, after it launched strikes disrupting shipping in the Red Sea following the beginning of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.
Those attacks have been punishing for the Houthis, and for the Yemenis in the areas of northwest Yemen under their control. They would have to justify any move towards war, or risk unrest from the populace.
“From this perspective, the Houthi renewed focus on Saudi Arabia [and] the blockade [of Sanaa Airport] … can be interpreted as an attempt to reconstruct a local narrative that portrays any future escalation with the Gulf as an extension of the Yemeni conflict, rather than simply a reflection of regional tensions or the interests of the Houthis’ allies [Iran and Hezbollah],” Salah said.
With the continuing mobilisation and pro-war discourse, Salah said that the Houthis are rearranging their priorities, working to redefine the “next enemy” and preparing public opinion for the possibility of a new escalation.
Truce to war?
While the years since 2022 have brought relative calm to areas under Houthi control, and even the opening of Sanaa International Airport to civilian travel for a period, the lack of conflict with the government and the Saudi-led coalition has made it more difficult for the Houthis to blame external parties for the economic difficulties areas under the group’s control are going through.
Meanwhile, the Yemeni government – with the backing of Saudi Arabia – has been able to consolidate some control in eastern and southern Yemen after its opponents within the anti-Houthi coalition, the separatist Southern Transitional Council, were defeated at the end of last year.
That has allowed the Yemeni government to turn its attention towards the Houthis. The beginning of the US war with Iran led to predictions of support from Washington for a government advance on the Houthis in Yemen, but a Gulf desire to ease tensions and de-escalate with Iran made that less likely.
Still, the Houthis and the Yemeni government may decide that an eventual return to war is inevitable, and each side may prefer to start such a conflict at a time of their choosing, rather than be forced into it.
Years of faltering diplomatic negotiations between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, as well as Saudi Arabia, have meant that a coming military battle cannot be ruled out, said Yemeni analyst Adel Dashela.
“Should the Houthi group continue to reject the peace proposals, the military option remains on the table, though its implementation is largely contingent on the Saudi position,” Dashela told Al Jazeera.
Four years from the truce that paused Yemen’s war, trust has not been built. Deals have been on the table, with a United Nations roadmap in late 2023 including funding for all public sector salaries, an end to restrictions on roads and airports, and the resumption of oil exports – all eventually leading to a political process that would end the war.
No deal was ever struck. And now all sides seem to be escalating their rhetoric, as well as their actions.
“Indications suggest that Riyadh is becoming less tolerant of the Houthis’ stalling tactics, which makes a renewed battle a possible scenario unless a political breakthrough occurs,” Dashela said.
The Yemeni government has also sought to emphasise the Houthis’ links to Iran, with military spokesperson Abdo Majali saying that the July 3 flight from Iran to Sanaa was evidence that Tehran continues to use the Houthis as a “tool to implement its expansionist project in the region and undermine the sovereignty of the Yemeni state”.
Meanwhile, a leading Houthi official, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, threatened Saudi Arabia in comments made to Al Jazeera following the strikes on Sanaa airport. “Their willingness to attack Sanaa airport to prevent flights from arriving or departing gives Yemen the right to strike their airports and to impose on them a siege just as they have done to us,” al-Bukhaiti said.
Frustration with deadlock
In Sanaa, the Houthis have been working to mobilise thousands of fighters for whatever battles may be about to take place.
Ali Mohammed, a member of the Houthis’ popular committees, said thousands of fighters were ready to take part should battles erupt.
“These fighters are true believers in the [Houthi] leadership, and they will implement any fighting instructions they receive,” Mohammed said.
Recently recruited fighters, he said, have received training on fighting on the front lines, and “they will be an indispensable backup to the [main Houthi] armed forces”.
Thousands of Yemenis have died in the country’s war, both from the fighting and from the accompanying famine and disease.
About 18.3 million people face acute food insecurity, placing Yemen among the most food‑insecure countries globally, according to UN reports. More than 2.2 million children under five are acutely malnourished, and approximately 2.6 million children do not go to school. The country’s GDP per person has fallen 58 percent since the war started, and ultimately civilians on both sides of the country’s divide are suffering.
The sense of limbo many Yemenis have felt over the past few years, and the failure of negotiations to bring an end to the war, has some hoping for some sort of conclusion.
For Abdullah, a government school teacher in Sanaa, the identity of the victor of the conflict doesn’t matter.
“The side that will win the coming war should be responsible for improving the livelihood of people, fixing the economic ordeal and stabilising the country,” Abdullah told Al Jazeera. “It needs to be swift and decisive, ending with one winner.”
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